Abstract-The emergence of RFID applications has huge influence to become pervasive in modern life. However the vulnerability of the transmission through the air and the unique identification number of RFID tag are the drawbacks that impact the popularity of RFID technology. In this paper, a mutual authentication protocol is proposed based on the challengeresponse model. The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is used as a cryptographic primitive to secure the data. The experimental works are carried out to validate the protocol in term of security and privacy. The timing analysis is also presented and applied to a case study of conveyor belt system.
INTRODUCTION
Recently Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) systems have been becoming popular and aiming to be ubiquitously applied in many areas including library, banking, logistics, transportation, manufacturing, supply chain system, military etc. Some large corporations who have deployed this technology are Wal-Mart, Procter and Gamble, and the United State Department of Defense [1] etc.
A RFID tag can be read as long as the item is within the range of the reader without requiring the line-of-sight operation as bar code technology. However, one of the biggest difficulties to the adoption of RFID technology is the lack of security and privacy. There is little security on the RFID tags or during the communication with reader which causes the RFID system vulnerable to many types of attacks e.g. information leakage, replay, denial of service [2] , [3] .
Many authentication protocols have been proposed to enhance the robustness of a RFID system. Some of them were developed based on cipher algorithms such as Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) or Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) [4] , [5] , [6] , [7] . Some utilised the hash-based algorithm, pseudo random number generator, Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) function and/or some ExOR and rotation operations [8] , [9] , [10] , [11] , [12] . Normally, cipherbased approaches are not preferred for passive tag because of its high computational cost and the large hardware area. However, with the advances in technology, it is feasible to embed the cipher engine on the passive tags but still guarantee the low tag's cost [5] .
The aim of this paper is to develop a protocol to provide a strong, high security and trustful authentication scheme which can protect against most of well-known RFID system attacks. Thus, a novel mutual authentication protocol based on AES primitives and challenge -response method is proposed. The symmetric block cipher AES-128 is utilised in this proposal because it has been standardised and proved to be secure [13] .
The rest of the paper is organised in six parts from section II to section VII. Section II briefly introduces the recent works. Section III proposes the novel protocol. In section IV, the analyses of the protocol in term of security and privacy are presented. Section V provides some experimental results. And section VI introduces a case study on conveyor belt system. The last section, section VII, is the conclusion of the paper.
II. RELATED WORKS

A. RFID security proposals
There are the number of researches to address RFID security and privacy issues. This paper roughly categorises them into two categories: cipher-based protocols which are developed on AES or ECC algorithms and hash-based protocols and others which are based on hash functions and/or some simple operators such as ExOR, rotation etc.
1) Cipher-based proposals
A strong authentication for RFID systems is introduced in [5] by implementing one-way encryption AES algorithm on RFID passive tag. A modified communication method between the reader and tag is also proposed in order to satisfy the strict timing requirement. However, this research reveals a possibility for the adversary to achieve the shared key of the AES encryption block [7] . In addition, the identical challenge always results in the identical cipher response which causes it to be susceptible to replay attack and tag clone. For example, assuming the challenge is the 16-bit output of Pseudo Random Number Generator [14] , it is feasible for attackers to collect a database of 65536 entries to impersonate the legitimate devices to obtain the authentication.
Extending from the research of [5] , [7] offers an advanced mutual authentication using the AES algorithm as a cryptographic primitive. The main issue of this protocol is easy to lose the synchronisation between the reader and the tag if the response from tag is blocked. Another security issue of this research is the man in the middle attack [6] .
[4] develops a mutual authentication protocol based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) which is an asymmetric cryptographic algorithm. However, it is susceptible to DOS attack. The attackers can modify the counter value in the message sent from the server to the tag by a much larger value in order to deceive the tag into updating it. In next authentication, because the counter value in the tag is greater than the one the server sends, the tag terminates the authentication process right away.
2) Hash-based proposals and others [11] proposed a mutual authentication protocol for passive tag which is based on cryptographic hash functions. A method to prevent the desynchronisation between a reader and a tag was proposed as well. This proposal however might disclose the issues of tracking, tag impersonation and the DOS attack [15] .
Another hash-based two-way authentication scheme which employs Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) and Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG) function was presented in [9] . Although it was claimed to be robust, the attackers are still able to track the tag due to its identical response. Furthermore, the replay attack and tag impersonation can be carried out to compromise the valid reader. For example, the attackers possibly play on the response from the tag embedded in the cheap product and then replay that to the standard item.
[12] proposed a scheme for RFID system conforming to EPC Class 1 Generation 2 specifications. However, [16] has pointed out many security failures in this protocol. Moreover, the DOS attack can be employed to desynchronise the database server and the tag [10] . [16] has also indicated the possibility of auto-desynchronisation at backend database up to 0.93 if the population of tags is greater than 2 18 tags.
To overcome the security issues of [12] , [10] enhanced the scheme to defend against DOS attack, replay attack, forward secrecy and privacy concern. However, [17] and [8] claimed that this proposed protocol is not invulnerable due to the insufficient size of the secure keys. Consequently, it is susceptible to Tag/Reader impersonation attack and desynchronisation as [17] also claimed.
III. THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL
A. Assumptions
• A tag has the AES-128 encrypting block on-board proposed in [26] .
• A reader and database server can perform AES-128 encryption and decryption.
• The channel between the reader and tag, the reader and backend database are vulnerable.
B. Initialisation phase
At the beginning, the backend database, the reader and the tag have the same shared key K. The seed s of each tag is stored on the server and on the rewriteable memory of tag. The ID is placed in tag's read-only memory and server as well. In addition, the server and reader keep the reader identification number ID R for reader authentication purpose.
C. Authentication phase
The authentication phase is illustrated in Figure 1 . Initially, the server generates E K (s⊕ID R ) and sends to the reader. The reader will decrypt this value to obtain the seed s by performing s=ID R ⊕(ID R ⊕s). Afterward, reader encrypts the seed s and forward to the queried tag.
• Step2: Reader-to-Tag authentication
On receiving E K (s), the tag employs the on-board AES encrypting block to produce its own E comparing with the ID existing in database to check whether this tag is legally acceptable or not. If the mismatch occurs, the server discards any data it has received and declines the authentication of the tag. Oppositely, the server updates the seed value of reader by s * =K⊕E K (s) to guarantee the synchronisation of the system.
IV. SECURITY AND PRIVACY ANALYSES
A. Information leakage
Due to the insufficient protections and unreliable security levels, the data transmitted through the air are easily compromised. In this protocol, there are two messages interchanged between the reader and the tag. However, these sensitive data are encrypted by AES-128 cryptographic block. The attackers cannot get the plaintext or the raw data. So the information leakage is evitable.
B. Tag tracking and tracing
For even EPC or IEEE standard, RFID tag is designed to have a unique number which can be tracked in range of any readers. However, this protocol provides the mechanism that whenever the counterfeit reader queries the tag, the tag does not send any response back. Consequently, the tracking and tracing privacy is secure in this protocol.
C. Tag clone
In theory, there is no tag which has similar unique identifier number to another one. However, adversaries can replicate the forged tag without much effort and expense [18] . To conduct the tag clone attack, the attackers have to obtain the key K, seed s and the ID of the tag. However, these shared data are kept safely and privately in the backend database and inside the tag; the attackers have no information to perform the same encryption block to acquire the authentication.
D. Man-in-the-middleattack
The adversative readers can impersonate the valid one in order to intercept, change and obtain the messages going between the parties which they need. In the proposed protocol, before querying the tag, the server sends the message E K (s⊕ID R ) to the reader. Because only valid reader has the key K to decrypt this cipher text, there is no possibility for attackers' readers to achieve the seed s in order to communicate with the tag. Thus the man-in-the-middle attack can be avoided.
E. DOS(Denial of Service) attack
It affects any wireless communication e.g. WiFi, RFID etc. by obstructing or intercepting the wireless signal that causes loss of synchronisation among the devices. Let us assume the scenario in which the response E K (s⊕ID) is intercepted by the adversary. Because the reader has not got the response from the tag, it does not update its seed. In the next authentication, reader sends E K (s) to challenge the tag. But the seed in tag now is s
is not satisfied and the tag keeps quiet. So the solution is that reader will attempt with E K (K⊕E K (s)). At this attempt, the synchronisation is reestablished. Hence, the proposed protocol is insusceptible to DOS attack.
F. Replay attack
In replay attack, the adversaries stand in the middle of communication channel to duplicate the valid transmission which will be fraudulently repeated later. However, the seed s is automatically updated after each successful authentication session. This leads to the fact that the cipher text E K (s) changes in every authentication cycle. Thus, the attackers cannot utilise the former data in order to deceive the authorised reader or tag to overcome the authentication process.
Overall, the proposed protocol is able to protect against many types of the known attacks. The comparison with other researches is shown in Table I to have a general view of the robustness of this protocol.
V. SIMULATION AND VALIDATION
The simulation is executed on a computer with Intel T3200 2GHz processor, 2GB of Ram memory on Windows 7 Ultimate. The C programming language has been used to develop the simulations. The AES core is the open source program designed by Niyaz PK [19] . 
A. Performance analysis
In this proposed protocol, the messages transmitted on the channel are always encrypted. However, the adversaries can play brute-force attack (BFA) to attempt to get the answer from the tag. But since the size of the message is 128 bits, it is not feasible to perform BFA entirely with all the possible cases (more than 3x10 38 ). Therefore, the simulation will randomly pick up an amount of random 128-bit input vectors (it is called sub-BFA) in order to verify the possibility of unintentional matches. The results are shown in Figure 2 . Another simulation is conducted to measure the average time to perform one typical AES-128 encrypting operation. It is shown that it takes about 37µs to complete.
From the simulation results, the protocol is robust to bruteforce attack. And in case the server desynchronises, it takes just a few seconds to perform the AES encrypting computations to obtain the synchronisation.
B. Timing analysis 1) Timing components
In this section, the minimum and maximum time requirements of the communication among the server, the reader and the tag are analysed. The time complexity is calculated based on the parameters in [14] . The timing model is shown in Figure 3 . T s , T r , T t : time for the database server, reader and tag to perform the AES algorithm respectively.
T c : time to transfer 128-bit message from the database to the reader through high-speed USB cable T r/t , T t/r : time to transmit 128-bit message from the reader to the tag and from the reader to the tag respectively.
The values of T s , T r , T t and T c can vary depending on the configuration of the server, reader, tag and the length of the cable, respectively.
2) Assumptions
• T s , T r , T t and T c are assumed to be constants.
• The computational times for AES encryption and decryption are the same. Figure 4 shows the timing details of communication between the reader and the tag. : time to transmit 128-bit message from the reader to tag and from the tag to reader Let T be the total time of an authentication cycle.
3) The minimum and maximum values
T = T database→tag + T tag→database = (T s + T c + T r + T r/t + T t ) +(T t + T t/r + T r + T c + T s ) (1)
In tag-to-database direction, the value T r is 0 because the reader just transfers the tag's response to the database without performing any AES operation.
Therefore, (1) can be written as (2).
T = 2 x (T s + T c + T t ) + T r + (T pu + T 1 + T 2 + T 3 + T 4 )
(2)
4) T s & T r
The database requires one AES operation in either database-to-tag or tag-to-database authentication. According to section V.A, the time requirement to perform one AES encrypting function is about 37µs, therefore T s = 37µs.
The reader requires two AES operations on the way from the database to tag. Based on the assumptions presented in section V.B.2), T r can be presented by (3).
T r = 2 x 37 = 74 μs (3)
5) T t
The AES encrypting operation at the tag takes 356 clock cycles at the frequency of 100 KHz [20] . So T t is calculated as below. 
6) T c
T c is computed by adding the time of transferring 128 bits from the server to the reader and the delay of the cable. Because the USB 2.0 can transfer at 480 Mbps and the cable delay is 26ηs [21] . So the value of T c is: [14] does not define the minimum of T pu , it only indicates the maximal value of 1500µs for powering up the tag. Therefore, let us assume the min(T pu ) = max(T pu ) = 1500 µs. [14] has given the equation to compute T 1 as (6).
7) T pu
8) T 1
To calculate RTcal and T pri , some values are given from [14] such as 6.25μs≤Tari≤25μs, 2.5Tari≤RTcal≤3.0Tari, Therefore, the minimum and maximum values for RTcal and TRcal can be expressed in (7) . min(RTcal) = 15.625μs; max(RTcal) = 75μs min(TRcal) = 17.1875μs; max(TRcal) = 225μs
Based on the minimum and maximum values of TRcal, the values of BLF and T pri can be found according to [14] . Hence the minimum and maximum values of T 1 can be derived from (6) as (9) and (10) 
9) T 2
The equation used to calculate T 2 is referred from [14] .
Therefore, the minimum and maximum values of T 2 can be computed as (11) . min(T 2 ) = 3 x min(T pri ) = 6.45μs max(T 2 ) = 20 x max(T pri ) = 210.06μs 
10) T 3 & T 4
In the reader-to-tag transmission, the reader starts signalling with either a preamble or a frame-sync as specified in [14] . This investigation assumes that the reader uses the frame sync which includes 3 components: delimiter=12.5µs; data-0=1Tari; RTcal [14] . The 128-bit data are sent afterward. At the end of the signalling either 2-bit 00 or 11 indicates the end of a communication. On the other hand, the tag starts the tag-toreader signalling with a 6-bit preamble, then 128-bit data and 2-bit end of signalling.
The minimum and maximum values of T 3 are shown in (12) and (13) Finally, deriving from (2) and the calculations above, the minimum and maximum values of T now can be resulted as (16) and (17) . 
VI. CASE STUDY: CONVEYOR BELT SYSTEM
The analysis and performance explained in section V.B are applied to estimate the maximum number of attempts for resynchronisation to a typical belt system as in Figure 5 . The items with RFID tags are moving evenly from position A to position B on the conveyor belt. The range of the reader is L and θ is the angle covered by the antenna of the reader. The speed of the conveyor belt, V b , is 2.5m/s which is the maximum speed in [22] . Hence, the time an item needs to move from A to B, denoted by t, is calculated as (18). [1] claimed that the read range varies from nominal range of 10cm to extended range of 50cm, so min(L) = 10cm and max(L) = 50cm. In addition, theoretically 0 ≤ θ <180, it is The maximum number of resynchronisation attempts, N is computed as (19) and (20) which are the best case scenario and worst case scenario respectively. These computations are based on (16) , (17) and (18). Figure 6 and Figure 7 shows the value of N in (19) and (20) If θ = 68° is chosen as a reliable read angle as mentioned in [23] , the values of N for min(L) = 10cm and max(L) = 50cm, are 6 and 29, respectively for the best case scenario or min(T). On the other hand, for the worst case scenario or max(T), the values are 4 and 23, respectively.
VII. CONCLUSION
The proposed protocol in this paper is a mutual authentication protocol which utilises AES-128 as a primitive to encrypt the messages transmitted on the channel. With that cipher block, the protocol can protect against many types of attacks such as information leakage, tag tracking etc. In addition, the secure keys stored in tag and sever are always updated in each authentication session, it is impossible for attackers to play the replay attack or trace back the previous data.
